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CRIMINOLOGY
DEFENDING CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS IN
IMBALANCED COURTROOMS
ESTHER NIR AND SIYU LIU*
Safeguarding Fourth Amendment protections is critical to preserving
individual privacy rights and fostering positive perceptions of police
legitimacy within communities. Maintaining an effective accountability
structure for police stops, searches, and seizures is a necessary step toward
achieving these objectives. In this article, we use qualitative interviews and
survey data with defense attorneys to explore—from a court community
perspective— their use of discretion to uphold the Exclusionary Rule through
bringing suppression motions. Data demonstrate that power dynamics within
the court community lead defense attorneys to conclude that litigating rights
violations is often a futile effort that interferes with favorable case outcomes
and important professional relationships. As a result, they sometimes opt to
refrain from filing suppression motions in exchange for favorable plea offers
and career aspirations. While understandable, these decisions frustrate the
ability of the judicial system to hold the police accountable for Fourth
Amendment violations.
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INTRODUCTION
Protection from unreasonable searches and seizures is a fundamental
right secured by the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
Police violations of the Fourth Amendment not only adversely impact
individual privacy rights but also erode perceptions of police legitimacy
within communities more broadly.1 Thus, deterring police from engaging in
unreasonable stops, searches, and seizures is a constitutional imperative, and

1
Tom R. Tyler & Jeffrey Fagan, Legitimacy and Cooperation: Why Do People Help
Police Fight Crime in Their Communities?, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 231, 253 (2008); Lorraine
Mazerolle, Emma Antrobus, Sarah Bennett & Tom R. Tyler, Shaping Citizen Perceptions of
Police Legitimacy: A Randomized Field Trial of Procedural Justice, 51 CRIMINOLOGY 33, 51–
56 (2013); Tom R. Tyler, Jeffrey Fagan & Amanda Geller, Street Stops and Police Legitimacy:
Teachable Moments in Young Urban Men’s Legal Socialization, 11 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD.
751, 765–71 (2014).
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procedural safeguards, including the Exclusionary Rule,2 have been
established to encourage police compliance with Fourth Amendment
mandates.3 In theory, these safeguards should serve as an accountability
structure for search and seizure related police conduct.
In the courtroom, judges and prosecutors play a role in operationalizing
this accountability structure and ensuring that Fourth Amendment violations
do not go unchecked. Judges may grant worthy suppression motions (i.e.,
motions brought by defendants to bar the prosecution from introducing
improperly seized evidence at trial) and send a message to police that Fourth
Amendment oversteps will not be tolerated. Prosecutors, who often
collaborate with police during investigations, may proactively instruct police
on Fourth Amendment mandates and make it clear to officers that illegally
seized evidence may be barred from use at trial.
Yet defense attorneys arguably have the most critical role in holding the
police accountable for Fourth Amendment violations. Specifically, they
possess discretion to initiate suppression motions to challenge the
constitutionality of police action. It is generally the defense attorney’s filing
of a suppression motion that fuels and directs the process of police
accountability in court. In this way, defense attorneys serve as frontline
defenders of Fourth Amendment rights and a check on police behavior.
Notably, defense’s filings of suppression motions are the primary catalysts
that move other court actors to hold the police accountable for Fourth
Amendment violations in that these motions are a prerequisite to judicial
rulings (i.e., a suppression motion must be filed for the court to rule on it).
Thus, defense attorneys hold a critical and indispensable role in
operationalizing the Exclusionary Rule.
But are defense attorneys motivated to serve as a check on police
conduct in court? Do dynamics within the court community complicate the
desire of defense attorneys to defend their clients’ Fourth Amendment rights?
In this article, we seek to explore how power dynamics within the court
community, concerns regarding relationships among prosecutors, judges, and
police officers, and the quest for efficient and favorable case dispositions
influence the manner in which defense attorneys litigate rights violations. For
example, we explore: How do defense attorneys react to their clients’
allegations of constitutional oversteps by police? What are the rationales
behind these reactions? How do defense attorneys perceive their position
within the court community and how do these perceptions influence their
2

The Exclusionary Rule is a judge-made rule that bars evidence obtained in violation of
a defendant’s constitutional rights from being used against him or her at trial.
3
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 657 (1961); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398
(1914).
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behavior? How do relationships among police officers, prosecutors, and
judges play a role in the process? Are there systemic or strategic disincentives
for defense attorneys to bring suppression motions?
To date, few empirical studies have explored these critical questions.
However, these nuanced courtroom dynamics are central to understanding
the extent to which the defense bar holds the police accountable for Fourth
Amendment violations. Using in-depth interviews and surveys with two
separate samples of defense attorneys, we explore the answers to these
questions by studying these uniquely positioned court actors who have
generally been overlooked by scholars in the criminal justice field.4 The
paper begins with a brief review of the Exclusionary Rule and suppression
motions, followed by a discussion of how and why defense attorneys exercise
their discretionary powers from a court community perspective. After placing
our study within this theoretical framework, we share our methodology and
our qualitative interview and descriptive survey results. We conclude the
paper with a discussion of the challenges faced by defense attorneys in
enforcing Fourth Amendment protections in profoundly imbalanced
courtrooms.
I. LITERATURE REVIEW
A. THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE AND SUPPRESSION MOTIONS

The Exclusionary Rule provides a remedy for defendants whose
constitutional rights have been violated by allowing them to move the court
to bar the prosecution from using illegally obtained evidence at trial.5 The
primary objective is to deter unconstitutional searches and seizures by police,
thereby preserving the integrity of the legal system. In the landmark Fourth
Amendment case of Mapp v. Ohio, the Court emphasized the importance of
preserving these rights: “Nothing can destroy a government more quickly
than its failure to observe its own laws.”6
Over the years, the Supreme Court has narrowed the scope of the
Exclusionary Rule in a series of defining decisions. In a monumental 1984

4
For examples of the few empirical studies that have been conducted, see Andrew L. B.
Davies & Janet Moore, Critical Issues and New Empirical Research in Public Defense: An
Introduction, 14 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 337, 337 (2017); Alissa Pollitz Worden, Kirstin A.
Morgan, Reveka V. Shteynberg & Andrew L. B. Davies, What Difference Does a Lawyer
Make? Impacts of Early Counsel on Misdemeanor Bail Decisions and Outcomes in Rural and
Small Town Courts, 29 CRIM. JUST. POL’Y REV. 710, 720–25 (2018).
5
Mapp, 367 U.S. at 650–55; Weeks, 232 U.S. at 390–92.
6
Mapp, 367 U.S. at 659.
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case,7 the good faith exception to the Exclusionary Rule was created. The
Leon Court held that evidence should not be excluded where an officer acted
in good faith, based on an objectively reasonable reliance on a search warrant
issued by a neutral judge or magistrate but later found to be invalid.8 In 2009,
the Supreme Court further limited the reach of the rule by expanding the good
faith exception to police error.9 In Herring, the arresting officer mistakenly
believed that an arrest warrant for the defendant was still in effect due to
outdated information in the police database.10 The Court concluded that the
Exclusionary Rule did not apply:
“To trigger the [E]xclusionary [R]ule, police conduct must be sufficiently deliberate
that exclusion can meaningfully deter it[] and sufficiently culpable that such deterrence
is worth the price paid by the justice system. As laid out in our cases, the [E]xclusionary
[R]ule serves to deter deliberate, reckless[] or grossly negligent conduct, or in some
circumstances recurring or systemic negligence.”11

More recently, in Utah v. Strieff, the Court ruled that evidence seized
incident to the defendant’s arrest could be used by the prosecution even
though the initial stop was illegal because the illegality was “sufficiently
attenuated” by a pre-existing search warrant discovered during the stop.12 In
its decision, the Court noted that the officer’s errors did not rise to the level
of a purposeful or flagrant violation.13 This decision, as well as other
modifications made by the Supreme Court over time, have limited the power
of the Exclusionary Rule to enforce Fourth Amendment protections.14
In order to invoke the Exclusionary Rule, defendants may bring
suppression motions alleging improper police conduct regarding stops,
searches, or seizures before the court.15 In deciding whether to grant or deny
a suppression motion, judges review statements of fact and legal arguments

7

United States. v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906–26 (1984).
Id. at 925–26. For subsequent cases applying the good faith exception to judges and
legislators, see Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981 (1984); Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S.
340 (1987); Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1 (1995).
9
Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 147 (2009).
10
Id. at 137–39.
11
Id. at 144.
12
Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2063 (2016).
13
Id.
14
See Julian A. Cook III, The Wrong Decision at the Wrong Time: Utah v. Strieff in the
Era of Aggressive Policing, 70 SMU L. REV. 293, 303–16 (2017); George M. Dery III,
Allowing “Lawless Police Conduct” in Order to Forbid “Lawless Civilian Conduct”: The
Court Further Erodes the Exclusionary Rule in Utah v. Strieff, 44 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 393,
414–30 (2017).
15
For examples of applicable procedures in different jurisdictions, see N.Y. CRIM. PROC.
LAW § 710 (Consol. 2020); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1538.5 (Deering 2020).
8
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posited by counsel.16 At times, hearings are conducted at which police
officers, defendants, and other eyewitnesses testify; judges evaluate the
credibility and reliability of witnesses and determine if suppression is
warranted.17 If the judge denies the suppression motion, the prosecutor may
use the challenged evidence at trial.18 If the court grants the motion, the
prosecutor is barred from using the evidence.19 In these situations, the
prosecutor may either dismiss the case if the remaining evidence is
insufficient to establish the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, or,
alternatively, proceed to trial with the remaining evidence.20
Since the exclusion of valuable prosecutorial evidence is an outcome
that police would arguably want to avoid, the threat that the seized evidence
will be suppressed should theoretically deter police conduct that violates
Fourth Amendment protections. Yet, empirical studies on the rule’s
effectiveness have yielded mixed results,21 and the rule has been the subject
of harsh critiques.22 For example, critics of the Exclusionary Rule argue that
the rule operates under limitations and constraints that inhibit its ability to
deter Fourth Amendment violations.23 Specifically, Counselor Oaks argued
that the Exclusionary Rule does not provide a direct disincentive for
unconstitutional police behaviors.24 Instead, the penalty for suppressed
evidence, if imposed, more directly affects prosecutors and their work on the
16

Esther Nir, Empowering the Exclusionary Rule: Using Suppression Motion Data to
Improve Police Searches and Seizures in the United States, 21 INT’L J. POLICE SCI. & MGMT.
96, 98 (2020) [hereinafter Nir, Empowering the Exclusionary Rule].
17
Joёlle Anne Moreno, Rights, Remedies, and the Quantum and Burden of Proof, 3 VA.
J. CRIM. L. 89, 131 (2015).
18
Nir, Empowering the Exclusionary Rule, supra note 16, at 98.
19
Id.
20
Id.
21
Thomas Y. Davies, A Hard Look at What We Know (and Still Need to Learn) About the
“Costs” of the Exclusionary Rule: The NIJ Study and Other Studies of “Lost” Arrests, 1983
AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 611, 688–89 (1983); Peter F. Nardulli, The Societal Cost of the
Exclusionary Rule: An Empirical Assessment, 1983 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 585, 606–07
(1983); Dallin H. Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. CHI. L.
REV. 665, 743–54 (1970); James E. Spiotto, Search and Seizure: An Empirical Study of the
Exclusionary Rule and Its Alternatives, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 243, 275–77 (1973).
22
See, e.g., Raymond A. Atkins & Paul H. Rubin, Effects of Criminal Procedure on Crime
Rates: Mapping Out the Consequences of the Exclusionary Rule, 46 J.L. ECON. 157, 173–74
(2003); David A. Harris, How Accountability-Based Policing Can Reinforce—Or Replace—
The Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule, 7 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 149, 210–12 (2009); Oaks,
supra note 21, at 707; Christopher Slobogin, Testilying: Police Perjury and What to Do About
It, 67 COLO. L. REV. 1037, 1057–59 (1996).
23
See Tonja Jacobi, The Law and Economics of the Exclusionary Rule, 87 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 585, 652–56 (2011); Oaks, supra note 21, at 724–25.
24
Oaks, supra note 21, at 755.
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case.25 Counselor Oaks further argued that the Exclusionary Rule fails to
address the norms and expectations within police departments regarding
street enforcement practice.26 Furthermore, judicial practice in adjudicating
suppression motions is often an impediment to the Exclusionary Rule’s
deterrent value. To illustrate, Professor Jacobi observed that many judges are
reluctant to suppress evidence and choose “avoidance and contraction” as a
mitigating strategy.27 Other studies have found that judges presiding over
suppression hearings are deferential to police testimony and overlook police
credibility concerns.28
B. DEFENSE ATTORNEYS IN A COURT COMMUNITY PERSPECTIVE

In most common law nations, the daily processing of criminal cases
likens to a well-oiled production line—“a conveyor belt [of] justice.”29 Such
rhythmic efficiency is not possible unless each member of the team follows
agreed-upon routines and procedures. Consequently, members of the court
community endeavor to formulate and protect a functioning norm.30
Classically defined as the court community perspective, court actors
(e.g., judges, prosecutors, and defense attorneys) share a common workplace.
While each court actor’s work is interdependent with the others’, the informal
relationships formed through the “community grapevine” serve an important
role in the performance of formal job functions.31 Viewed as members of this
community, defense attorneys are not isolated agents. To the contrary, they
are “agent-mediators” between the court and the defendant and play an
indispensable part in ensuring that the plea-bargaining process runs
smoothly.32 Despite their opposing roles, defense attorneys often develop
25

Id.
Id.
27
Jacobi, supra note 23, at 657.
28
Jennifer E. Laurin, Quasi-Inquisitorialism: Accounting for Deference in Pretrial
Criminal Procedure, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 783, 792–93 (2014); Anna Lvovsky, The
Judicial Presumption of Police Expertise, 130 HARV. L. REV. 1995, 2077–78 (2017); Myron
W. Orfield, Jr., Deterrence, Perjury, and the Heater Factor: An Exclusionary Rule in the
Chicago Criminal Courts, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 75, 108–14 (1992); Rachel Moran, Contesting
Police Credibility, 93 WASH. L. REV. 1339, 1378–79 (2018); Melanie D. Wilson, Improbable
Cause: A Case for Judging Police by a More Majestic Standard, 15 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L.
259, 284–305 (2010).
29
ROGER COTTERRELL, THE SOCIOLOGY OF LAW: AN INTRODUCTION 160 (2d ed. 2005).
30
Peter F. Nardulli, Insider Justice: Defense Attorneys and the Handling of Felony Cases,
77 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 379, 387 (1986) [hereinafter Nardulli, Insider Justice].
31
JAMES EISENSTEIN, ROY B. FLEMMING & PETER F. NARDULLI, THE CONTOURS OF
JUSTICE: COMMUNITIES AND THEIR COURTS 41–42 (1988).
32
Abraham S. Blumberg, The Practice of Law as Confidence Game: Organizational
Cooptation of a Profession, 1 L. & SOC’Y REV. 15, 20 (1967).
26
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shared values and expectations with their “adversaries” in the court
community due to close working relationships they maintain with other court
regulars.33
Nevertheless, compared to other court actors, defense attorneys are
positioned in a uniquely challenging predicament within the criminal
adversarial system. Specifically, they are tasked with delicately managing
defendants’ interests while balancing the important objective of court
community cohesion.34 A critical job expectation for defense attorneys is to
protect their clients vigilantly and zealously from the overreach of
government power.35 In fact, defense attorneys are often the first courtroom
actor to be exposed to allegations of rights violations; sometimes this
knowledge is obtained by reading a police report that shows “the first hint of
police impropriety”36 or from their client telling their story. Yet, as “regulars”
in the court community, defense attorneys inevitably share the common
community mission that overall court efficiency is a priority.37 Professor
Mears argues that case resolution is the common leading motivator that
directs the exercise of discretion by all court actors, including defense
attorneys.38 For defense attorneys, fulfilling this mission may be complicated
by practical concerns; while bringing constitutional challenges is often a
necessary aspect of effective defense work, litigating these challenges may
hinder faster case disposition and reduce efficiency.39 When such incongruity
occurs, the commitment to the court organization often triumphs. In fact, it
has been recognized that rights violations are sometimes overlooked for the
sake of court efficiency.40
In addition to case resolution and courtroom efficiency, other practical
concerns may influence the manner in which defense attorneys perform their
33
Nardulli, Insider Justice, supra note 30, at 416; ARTHUR ROSETT & DONALD R.
CRESSEY, JUSTICE BY CONSENT: PLEA BARGAINS IN THE AMERICAN COURTHOUSE 104 (1976).
34
Nardulli, Insider Justice, supra note 30, at 379.
35
See MODEL CODE OF PRO. RESP. Canon 7 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1980).
36
Orfield, supra note 28, at 101.
37
Nardulli, Insider Justice, supra note 30, at 387.
38
DANIEL P. MEARS, OUT-OF-CONTROL CRIMINAL JUSTICE: THE SYSTEMS IMPROVEMENT
SOLUTION FOR MORE SAFETY, JUSTICE, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND EFFICIENCY (2017) (discussing
the priorities of the criminal justice system and drastically increased occurrences of punitive
outcomes).
39
Albert W. Alschuler, The Defense Attorney’s Role in Plea Bargaining, 84 YALE L.J.
1179, 1238 (1975); EISENSTEIN, FLEMMING & NARDULLI, supra note 31, at 33; JEFFREY T.
ULMER, SOCIAL WORLDS OF SENTENCING: COURT COMMUNITIES UNDER SENTENCING
GUIDELINES 117 (Austin T. Turk ed., 1997) (discussing the influence of court organizational
contexts on case processing and sentencing outcomes).
40
PAT O’MALLEY, LAW, CAPITALISM AND DEMOCRACY: A SOCIOLOGY OF AUSTRALIAN
LEGAL ORDER 127 (Ronald Wild ed., 1983).
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roles. For example, Professor Blumberg regarded the defense attorneys’
priorities of “maximum production and the particularistic career designs of
organizational incumbents” as the “higher claim” than due process
protection41 and maintained that any conflicts of interest are often resolved
“in favor of the organization which provides [the defense attorney] with the
means for his [or her] professional existence.”42 Furthermore, informal
relationships between defense attorneys and other court actors in the
community may interfere with the construction and implementation of a
zealous defense. In her research, Professor Walker Wilson found that the
ability of defense attorneys to work closely and efficiently with other court
actors is inversely related to their ability to critically examine case processing
and its effect on their clients.43
The power differential in the court community may also influence the
way in which defense attorneys choose to perform their roles. Unlike judges
and prosecutors who “possess an effectively unreviewable power over
sentencing,”44 defense attorneys hold the least amount of discretionary
power: “In a system where discretion is the coin of the realm, defense
attorneys are paupers.”45 Perceptions of powerlessness and assessments of
likely case outcomes may play a role in strategic defense decisions.46 For
example, in determining whether to advise a client to file a suppression
motion, defense attorneys may consider the chances of the motion being
granted,47 the likelihood of damage to the defense position by raising the
challenge (e.g., receiving undesirable plea offers),48 and reputations of the

41

Blumberg, supra note 32, at 19.
Id. at 38.
43
Molly J. Walker Wilson, Defense Attorney Bias and the Rush to the Plea, 65 KAN. L.
REV. 271, 272 (2016).
44
Alschuler, supra note 39, at 1252.
45
Robin Walker Sterling, Defense Attorney Resistance, 99 IOWA L. REV. 2245, 2257
(2014).
46
See Brian D. Johnson, Trials and Tribulations: The Trial Tax and the Process of
Punishment, 48 CRIME & JUST. 313 (2019) (discussing “trial tax” and the cost of exercising
constitutional rights).
47
See Margareth Etienne, The Ethics of Cause Lawyering: An Empirical Examination of
Criminal Defense Lawyers as Cause Lawyers, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1195, 1245
(2005).
48
See Oaks, supra note 21, at 748; see also THE SPANGENBERG GROUP, THE STATUS OF
INDIGENT DEFENSE IN GEORGIA: A STUDY FOR THE CHIEF JUSTICE’S COMMISSION ON INDIGENT
DEFENSE, PART I 90 (2003) (discussing defense attorneys’ concerns about their work in court
when considering filing motions and appearing zealous).
42
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prosecutor and the judge,49 among other factors. Moreover, for public
defenders, caseload may determine how much time and attention can
realistically be devoted to each case, contributing to the metaphor of
“assembly-line justice.”50 These analyses are often developed based on
defense attorneys’ perceptions of court community dynamics and their
perceived ability to navigate those dynamics effectively. In this way, the
assessment of the client’s best interest becomes a balance of obtaining
minimal punishment and the need for rights protection, reasonable to “the
norms and understandings” of the court community.51
C. DEFENSE ATTORNEYS’ PERCEPTIONS OF THE POLICE AS PART OF
THE COURT COMMUNITY

In its original theoretical framework, the court community perspective
does not specifically include the police. Instead, when discussing the
members of the court community, Professor Eisenstein and his colleagues
wrote: “All are lawyers, sharing the relatively high status that this profession
accords its members and the common experience of attending law school and
practicing law.”52 While Professor Eisenstein and colleagues referenced
nonlawyers in the courtroom, this discussion touched on the “courtroom
staff, clerks, office secretaries, and court administrators” (without reference
to the police) and the role they play in contributing to the community
grapevine.53
Few studies have identified that police officers play a notable role in
courtroom dynamics,54 and existing literature regarding this role is somewhat
scarce and vague. Some scholars have indirectly touched on the relationships
between police and other powerful court actors by exploring judicial and
prosecutorial deference to police.55 As members of the courtroom
workgroup, defense attorneys observe the interactions between police and
judges, including the tendency of judges to defer to the police.56 Through
49

See Alschuler, supra note 39 (discussing defense attorneys’ calculations of how trial
judges and prosecutors would meet their strategies and how they effectively advise their
clients by thinking about the risks of losing).
50
Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 58 (1972).
51
See Nardulli, Insider Justice, supra note 30, at 415 (discussing the role of attorneys who
are court regulars in sustaining the norms and status quo of the court).
52
EISENSTEIN, FLEMMING & NARDULLI, supra note 31, at 34.
53
Id.
54
But see JAMES EISENSTEIN & HERBERT JACOB, FELONY JUSTICE: AN ORGANIZATIONAL
ANALYSIS OF CRIMINAL COURTS (1977) (discussing environmental forces in the court).
55
See Laurin, supra note 28, at 787–88; Lvovsky, supra note 28, at 2000; Moran, supra
note 28, at 1344.
56
See Wilson, supra note 28, at 287.

2021]

RIGHTS IN IMBALANCED COURTROOMS

511

witnessing verbal and nonverbal communications, defense attorneys
internalize the often favorable judicial attitude toward police and integrate
these observations into their rational prediction of case outcomes; these
predictions influence the manner in which they formulate defense
strategies.57 For example, using survey data of defense attorneys, Professor
Kittel described that defense attorneys believe that police perjury is prevalent
and that they are “forced to take such perjury into account” in their defense
work.58 As one defense attorney in Alschuler’s study stated: “That policeman
has a shield to back his story. What have you got? Are you employed? Don’t
you have a record?”59 Defense attorneys may also observe some of the
interactions between prosecutors and police, including the influential role
that the arresting officer plays in charging decisions.60
Indeed, when considering potential Fourth Amendment challenges,
defense attorneys may consider whether pursuing such action would serve
the best interest of their client or their own status in the court community.
Particularly when protecting procedural rights of defendants is not prioritized
or valued in a court community,61 defense attorneys may perceive that
bringing constitutional challenges is harmful to their clients. For example,
while a decision to file a suppression motion may help the greater universe
of defendants by establishing critical case law to guide future court
decisions,62 continuing to pursue Fourth Amendment challenges when
favorable plea offers are presented may entice even innocent defendants to
accept “an almost irresistible bargain” to avoid the risk of less favorable
dispositions. 63
In sum, a review of scholarship to date establishes that the effectiveness
of the Exclusionary Rule is limited, and that its efficiency to deter Fourth
Amendment violations by police is questionable. While some scholarship
explores the weak positioning of the defense attorney within the court
community and the influence of court community dynamics on defense
advocacy decisions, little empirical work exists that builds a direct
57

Nardulli, Insider Justice, supra note 30 (discussing the active role of defense attorneys
in contributing to the norms of the court community and their tendency to avoid deviating
from those norms).
58
Norman G. Kittel, Police Perjury: Criminal Defense Attorneys’ Perspective, 11 AM. J.
CRIM. JUST. 11, 19–20 (1986).
59
Alschuler, supra note 39, at 1192.
60
See David W. Neubauer, After the Arrest: The Charging Decision in Prairie City, 8 L.
& SOC’Y REV. 495, 498–99 (1974) (discussing the role arresting officers may play in the setting
of initial charges).
61
Blumberg, supra note 32, at 19; MEARS, supra note 38, at 204.
62
See Etienne, supra note 47, at 1241–42.
63
Oaks, supra note 21, at 748.
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connection between court community dynamics and defense attorneys’
decisions to file suppression motions and pursue Fourth Amendment
challenges. Our study intends to fill this gap.
II. DATA AND SAMPLING
A. INTERVIEW SAMPLE

The interview data for this study were drawn from in-depth interviews
with a sample of forty criminal defense attorneys practicing criminal law in
a U.S. state. To “ensure that the same basic lines of inquiry were pursued
with each person,”64 we used semi-structured interviews. Data was analyzed
using an inductive, grounded theory approach and theoretical categories were
used “[to] place the . . . data into a more general or abstract framework.”65
Numerous themes emerged including a perceived reluctance of judges to
grant suppression motions, a perceived tendency of prosecutors to protect the
police, and feelings of exclusion or being “the odd person out” by defense
attorneys, among others. Data from newer interviews were consistently
compared with prior interviews and emerging themes were continuously
refined to reflect the complete body of data.
Data collection began on September 26, 2017 and concluded on July 1,
2019. We accessed the names and contact information for our interviewees
through online research, personal contacts, referrals from interviewees, and
cold-calling methods.66 Our interviewees regularly interact with defendants,
police officers, prosecutors, and judges. Among other responsibilities, these
attorneys conduct suppression hearings and trials, and cross-examine police
officers during the course of these proceedings. Of the forty attorneys
interviewed, fifteen currently serve as public defenders while twenty-five are
engaged in private practice. Years of legal experience range from two to
forty-one years. Six attorneys are former prosecutors and twenty-nine of the
forty attorneys served as a public defender during some point in their careers.
Interviews were conducted in the attorneys’ offices and generally lasted for
one hour. The demographic statistics for both our survey and interview
samples are presented in Table 1.

64
MICHAEL QUINN PATTON, QUALITATIVE RESEARCH & EVALUATION METHODS 343 (3d
ed. 2002).
65
JOSEPH A. MAXWELL, QUALITATIVE RESEARCH DESIGN: AN INTERACTIVE APPROACH 97
(2d ed. 2005).
66
Esther Nir, Approaching the Bench: Accessing Elites on the Judiciary for Qualitative
Interviews, 21 INT’L J. SOC. RES. METHODOLOGY 77, 80 (2018).
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B. SURVEY SAMPLE

The survey was designed by the authors as part of a larger project on
defense attorney perceptions of the police. The survey includes questions
regarding professional experience in criminal law practice, experience in
Fourth Amendment challenges, and perceptions of police practice in
general.67 Survey data for this study were collected by reaching out to
members of an Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers in the same state,
which contained approximately 900 members at the time of collection. An
invitation email with a Qualtrics survey link was circulated to the member
list and three reminder emails were sent to complete the survey. To improve
participation, follow up phone calls were used to encourage members to
participate in our project. In addition to this organization, chief public
defenders in every county in the state were reached via phone calls. Twelve
percent of the counties agreed to participate and circulate our survey within
their offices. We also used a snowball sampling technique and encouraged
all participating lawyers to forward the link to their peers and colleagues via
email; this respondent-based sampling method enabled us to reach a
subpopulation who is typically hard to reach.68
The survey administration commenced in May 2018, and by the end of
the survey data collection in April 2019, we received 124 completed surveys
and twenty-nine partially completed surveys (ranging from 2% to 41% of
completion). We excluded the data of thirteen respondents who had
previously participated in our interviews, making our survey and interview
samples mutually exclusive. Thus, our final survey sample size is 140 with
seventy-three respondents (52%) reported as public defenders, eleven of
whom (15%) also accept court-appointed work or have a private business,
and thirty-six respondents (26%) as private attorneys, seventeen of whom
(12%) accept court-appointed work. Thirty-five respondents (25%) did not
report their profession.
Our survey data is limited. While presented as supplemental descriptive
results to the qualitative interview data, the survey sample is relatively small.
When larger, multi-level data are available, more statistical analyses could
be performed to examine the variations in relevant perceptions between
different groups of attorneys by level of experience, case type, jurisdiction,
and courtroom. Similarly, future studies should examine differences in
perceptions between private and public defense attorneys, and the statistical
relationship between perceptions (on court community dynamics and client
67

Two practicing attorneys reviewed an earlier version.
Douglas D. Heckathorn & Christopher J. Cameron, Network Sampling: From Snowball
and Multiplicity to Respondent-Driven Sampling, 43 ANN. REV. SOC. 101, 105 (2017).
68
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interest) and specific strategic decisions. Given the critical role that court
actors play in protecting Fourth Amendment rights, enhancing our
understanding of nuanced court community dynamics is critical to effective
police accountability.69 Additionally, while fifteen percent of our interview
sample reported having a prior legal background (e.g., former prosecutor),
our data are restricted to defense attorneys and cannot speak to perceptions
by prosecutors or judges. Future studies should extend this discussion to
other courtroom actors.

Table 1 Descriptive statistics of survey and interview samples
Variables

Samples
Survey (n=140)
Interview (n=40)

Practicing county size (by populationa)
<200,000
20
200,000~500,000
46
500,000~1,000,000
24
>1,000,000
19
Legal experience
5 years or less
21
6 to 10 years
24
11 to 20 years
19
21 to 30 years
15
more than 30 years
24
Prior relevant experience*
None reported
106
Prosecutor
22
Court clerk
9
Social worker
2
Judge
1
Police or Investigator
1

14%
33%
17%
14%

2
31
0
7

5%
78%
0%
18%

15%
17%
14%
11%
17%

10
9
10
2
8

25%
23%
25%
5%
20%

76%
16%
6%
1%
1%
1%

30
6
2
1
0
1

75%
15%
5%
3%
0%
3%

69
Gregory D. Russell, The Political Ecology of Police Reform, 20 POLICING: INT’L J.
POLICE STRATEGIES & MGMT. 567, 571 (1997).
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Note: Sums of categories may not add up to 100% due to missing cases. Prior relevant
experience may exceed 100% due to multiple selection allowed.
a
Population data is retrieved from the 2010 Census.
*Many respondents have extensive prior criminal public defender or private defense
experience.
III. RESULTS
A. PERCEIVED POWER IMBALANCE IN THE COURT COMMUNITY

The vast majority of criminal defense attorneys in the interview sample
perceive a profound power imbalance in the court community. Specifically,
most sampled attorneys regard themselves as weak members of the court
community, standing against a powerful coalition of judges, prosecutors, and
police who largely possess unified interests that are averse to the defense
position. Notably, the majority of our respondents perceive that this
imbalance is exacerbated by prosecutors and judges who are inclined to
believe, favor, and protect police from defense allegations of police
misconduct or mistake, even in situations where such support is blatantly
unjustified. These prevalent and deeply rooted perceptions revolve around
defense attorneys’ impressions of (1) judicial favoritism toward police and
prosecutors; (2) close and protective relationships between prosecutors and
police; and (3) the disrespected outsider position of the defense attorney in
the courtroom work group. In this section, we report on these perceptions that
contribute to defense attorneys’ beliefs that they are mostly powerless to hold
the police accountable for constitutional violations in profoundly imbalanced
court communities.
1. Perceptions of Judicial Favoritism Toward Police
The majority of defense attorneys interviewed perceive that judges
regularly display favoritism toward police officers. According to these
attorneys, the tendency of judges to believe and protect police reduces police
accountability and (at times) impedes defense counsels’ efforts to defend
their clients’ constitutional rights.
i. Credibility Calls Favor the Police
Nearly twenty percent of attorneys interviewed perceive that judges are
conditioned to believe police officer testimony, even when other case
evidence indicate that the officer is not being truthful. As one attorney stated,
“God himself can come down and say, ‘Judge, that officer is lying,’ and it
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doesn’t matter.”70 Other attorneys perceive that credibility contests between
police officers and defendants typically resolve in the officer’s favor,
whether or not the officer appears credible in court. For example, one
attorney lamented that “it is almost guaranteed that whatever the cop says is
gold and whatever my client says is not”71 and another explained the
inevitable disadvantage that some criminal defendants face:
You put somebody in uniform and they look bright and shiny in the public and the
judge loves them, and then you have your client who’s a 23-year-old drug addict, and
who are you going to believe? The officer or your client? Of course, they are going to
believe the officer, even if the officer has a shitty reputation. It’s not fair game, and
they intentionally don’t let it be fair.72

Moreover, almost twenty percent of the interviewed attorneys described
instances where particular judges found an officer credible, despite the
respondents’ perceptions that blatant case facts demonstrated a lack of officer
trustworthiness: “[Judges] tend to just kind of overlook police
inconsistencies in their stories more times than not in my experience and give
them the benefit of the doubt.”73 Another attorney equated judicial
overconfidence in police credibility with hero worship in certain locations:
In the counties it’s more like hero worship than deference. It’s completely different.
It’s not just a matter of deference, it’s a matter of they’re shocked that you could accuse
a police officer of not telling the truth. They’re like, “What are you talking about? He’s
a police officer.”74

ii. Judges are protective of the police
Several interviewed attorneys shared their perceptions of specific
instances in which judges attempted to “protect” testifying police officers.
For example, one attorney described a situation where the judge scolded the
attorney for impeaching an officer’s credibility:
“When are you going to knock this off?” He goes, “Do you think you are trying a
murder case?” And I said to him. I said, “Well no, it’s not a murder case but it’s the
case I am trying.” And he said, “Well, you’ve already got this guy because what he’s
described is obviously incredible. Why don’t you just stop where you’re at. You’ve got
enough to win.”75

Another attorney recounted a time when the judge thanked her for
refraining from exposing an officer’s missteps during cross-examination: “I
70
71
72
73
74
75

Interview with Respondent T12 (confidential interview on file with the authors).
Interview with Respondent T13 (confidential interview on file with the authors).
Interview with Respondent T16 (confidential interview on file with the authors).
Interview with Respondent T23 (confidential interview on file with the authors).
Interview with Respondent T27 (confidential interview on file with the authors).
Interview with Respondent T21 (confidential interview on file with the authors).
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(Judge) really appreciate that you didn’t attack the cops in this case.”76 A few
attorneys noted that some judges avoid “calling out” officers in court, even
in situations where the given judge finds that the officer violated
constitutional search and seizure protections:
Our judges are cowardly. A lot of the judges will not rule on the bench because they
don’t want to rule against a police officer. So, when those cases come around, they’ll
say, “Oh, well, I’ll take it under consideration,” and four months later they will show
an opinion. And that officer doesn’t know until the prosecutor tells the officer that “we
lost that case.” Nothing is done. The judge will never say anything to the officer.77

2. Prosecutorial Favoritism Toward the Police
A majority of defense attorneys in our interviews perceive that
prosecutors display favoritism toward police officers during criminal case
processing. First, several attorneys perceive that, similar to judges,
prosecutors are overconfident in the credibility of police officer testimony:
Most of the prosecutors don’t seem to believe that police officers would lie . . . You
could catch a cop in a lie, and they still believe in all of the other stuff that cop said and
did. They can’t look at a cop, know their name, know they are going to call them (the
officers) to the stand and admit that they could be lying about something. They just
can’t do it.78

Several attorneys perceive that prosecutors avoid admonishing police
officers, even when the circumstances warrant such action:
I had a case once where I filed a suppression motion for a trooper that I believe did
something illegal. Off record, the DA basically said, “Yeah, I know that he is constantly
doing this,” but they didn’t want to be the one to admonish him. They didn’t want to
get off that façade of buddy-buddy with the police.79

A number of defense attorneys perceive that prosecutors often allow
police officers to dictate how a case will be handled in court: “A lot of the
DAs will listen to the cop, and if the cop says, ‘absolutely not, no deals,’ then
at the prelim[inary hearing] my client is not getting a deal.”80
About a third of our respondents shared their perceptions that this
favoritism may be due to the nature of the relationships between prosecutors
and police officers, both in and out of the workplace. First, police officers
and prosecutors generally have strong professional partnerships:

76
77
78
79
80

Interview with Respondent T3 (confidential interview on file with the authors).
Interview with Respondent T17 (confidential interview on file with the authors).
Interview with Respondent T26 (confidential interview on file with the authors).
Interview with Respondent T8 (confidential interview on file with the authors).
Interview with Respondent T13 (confidential interview on file with the authors).

518

NIR & LIU

[Vol. 111

Prosecutors are overwhelmingly pro police. I mean, they work in concert. Prosecutors
don’t necessarily see themselves as being, you know, independent of the police. They
see themselves as working hand in hand with the police, and they develop these very
strong relationships.81

In addition to being close work partners, prosecutors and police officers
often have personal relationships, as well as professional ones:
They are in basketball leagues together and they go out together and I just think
sometimes when you’re prosecuting a case it’s hard to believe that this officer is doing
wrong when . . . you are like socializing with them and stuff.82

And another noted:
A lot of them actually date and um, I think that the prosecutors feel like they represent
the police. So, if your client wants a deal, they have to contact the police officer and if
your client ticked off the police officer, you’re probably not going to get a deal. Things
of that nature.83

3. The Defense Position: “Lowest Rung on the Ladder”
A majority of interviewed defense attorneys perceive themselves as the
weakest member of the courtroom work group, positioned against a powerful
alliance of prosecutors, police, and, at times, even judges: “You don’t get the
same respect that the prosecution gets. You’re kind of seen as like bottom of
the totem pole.”84 A second defense attorney noted:
I’m like one step above my client, and we’re on the bottom end. Yeah, the court gives
deference to the district attorney usually, and then they will also treat the police officers,
probation officers . . . with a bit more respect, and then they’ll get to us and it’s like,
“Oh, by the way, you two are still here. Great! What do you want?”85

Another attorney described the emotional ramifications arising from
these perceived courtroom dynamics: “It can feel like multiple people against
you and you almost get this weird kind of feeling in your stomach like high
school. Like the cool kids and the outsiders.”86
In describing the power differential between defense attorneys and other
court actors, one attorney expressed, “The only power I have derives from
the Constitution and how I can implement it in individual cases.”87 Yet,
another attorney noted that defense attorneys are only one check (and, at

81
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83
84
85
86
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Interview with Respondent T23 (confidential interview on file with the authors).
Interview with Respondent T2 (confidential interview on file with the authors).
Interview with Respondent T8 (confidential interview on file with the authors).
Id.
Interview with Respondent T16 (confidential interview on file with the authors).
Interview with Respondent T7 (confidential interview on file with the authors).
Interview with Respondent T28 (confidential interview on file with the authors).
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times, an ineffective one) on police power to ensure that constitutional
mandates are followed:
I think it’s just the unchecked power. And I feel that often times defense attorneys are
considered to be that check in power. And we are, but we’re just one check. And the
struggle becomes that the DAs office, in my opinion, is not checking the police the way
they should . . . there’s a failure in recognizing that we’re all in this together, and that
we all serve as checks and balances to each other. And so there is an alignment that I
feel out of. And so it can feel overwhelming, and it adds to those feelings of isolation,
when you feel like you have to overcompensate for the checks and balances that aren’t
happening from the other professionals.88

During our interviews, several attorneys lamented that police officers
often treat defense attorneys with a lack of respect that weakens the defense
position:
I have had officers in cross-examination not respond to my question but return my
question with a question back at me. [They] know that’s not allowed. They are
professional witnesses . . . [The judge] made a joke of it . . . it encourages that kind of
nonresponsiveness.89

Other attorneys described situations where police officers made
derogatory comments regarding their clients, such as, “Your client is a piece
of shit,”90 and treated the attorney with distain.
B. PERCEIVED IMPORTANCE OF GETTING ALONG WITH
PROSECUTORS, JUDGES, AND POLICE

As the weakest member of the courtroom work group, defense attorneys
must navigate carefully to foster productive connections with court
community stakeholders that will enable them to achieve the best possible
outcomes for all of their clients. Getting along with prosecutors, judges, and
even police officers is often necessary to build and maintain needed working
relationships.
In our sample, over a third of our respondents expressed the importance
of developing positive relationships—or repairing damaged ones—with
judges and prosecutors:
I think it’s in my professional interest to serve my clients as best as possible to have a
good relationship with prosecutors and with judges, so as a professional, I try to
cultivate a good relationship with prosecutors and also with the judges that will be
hearing my cases.91
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Interview with Respondent T7 (confidential interview on file with the authors).
Id.
Interview with Respondent T3 (confidential interview on file with the authors).
Interview with Respondent T29 (confidential interview on file with the authors).
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A second attorney expressed the importance of repairing damaged
relationships with prosecutors for the sake of future clients:
I’ve had experiences where a relationship has gone south. We have a case that we just
can’t see eye-to-eye . . . but then ultimately, out of necessity, the relationships are again
repaired at some point because for the next client you may have to try and work out a
deal and you don’t want the district attorney pissed off at you.”92

Cognizant of the need to be viewed as a “reasonable” advocate, several
attorneys discussed the wisdom of “looking at the bigger picture” and letting
issues go for the greater good: “I mean, there was definitely a feeling at the
public defender’s office when I was there that you should choose your battles
rather than be an office that is aggressively fighting every issue.”93 For
example, one attorney was concerned about potential repercussions from
filing too many suppression motions before the same judge: “I went through
a phase where I filed like seven suppression motions in a month or
something . . . and it’s like, I don’t want to hurt my own credibility with the
judge because they are all going in front of the same judge.”94 And another
defense attorney stated:
I have a reputation that I have to build on. If I want to have a dog fight every time I
have a case, then I can build that reputation, or if I want to be able to work things out,
I still have to maintain some sort of level. So my policy is to lead with sugar and then
go to cinnamon if I need to.95

In addition to feeling a need to develop effective working relationships
with judges and prosecutors, some attorneys discussed the importance of
getting along well with the police since prosecutors often defer to police:
I can tell you from a strategic standpoint, one of the first things that I tend to do is get
the cop on my side. Cause if I have the cop, then I am three quarters of the way to
getting the prosecutor where I need them to be.96

A handful of defense attorneys shared techniques and war stories
regarding how they “won over” police officers. One respondent described the
effectiveness of disparaging his own client in forging positive relationships
with police officers:
If they hear me make fun of a client—I hate to say it that way—that makes me look
more reasonable to them, because they think “how can you defend these bad guys
through and through?” So if I show myself as being a little bit reasonable in their eyes,
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Interview with Respondent T16 (confidential interview on file with the authors).
Id.
Interview with Respondent T6 (confidential interview on file with the authors).
Interview with Respondent T12 (confidential interview on file with the authors).
Interview with Respondent T15 (confidential interview on file with the authors).
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then I can get them to meet me halfway. It works with a lot of them, and some of them,
it doesn’t work at all.97

This defense attorney further shared his strategy of capitalizing on
existing relationships with prosecutors and judges to build credibility with
the police:
The cops are like the hardest ones for me to reach. Because I know they don’t like me
immediately, but if I can be like shooting the shit with the DA and the judge while
we’re just sitting there, inevitably a cop or two will start to join, because they like the
judge and they like the prosecutor. They’re not going to be sure about me, but if I can,
I try to get them to like me.98

A few defense attorneys described how positive relationships with
police officers lead to better results for their clients. For example, one stated:
There’s a public defender that works here that’s getting married on Friday to a police
officer. He goes to a lot of our office functions. We really like him a lot. It actually has
strengthened our relationship in dealing with cases because of her. Before we knew him
on a personal level, that police officer had the reputation of being a little aggressive
with our clients. Then, whether it’s a product of dating her, or her telling him war
stories, that seems to have stopped. At least, I don’t hear it anymore and he’s a lot more
reasonable to work with.99

C. PERCEIVED CHALLENGES IN HOLDING THE POLICE ACCOUNTABLE

Given the perceived power imbalance in the court community and the
goal of many defense attorneys to promote positive relationships with
prosecutors, judges, and police, the decision of whether and how to hold the
police accountable for constitutional violations is often difficult. In their
professional roles, defense attorneys should provide a check on illegal search
and seizure activity by police. Yet, the need for favorable case resolution and
effective career management often dictates letting valid suppression issues
go in exchange for better case outcomes and positive long-term relationships
with powerful court actors. In this section, we explore how perceived
courtroom dynamics lead defense attorneys to conclude that holding police
accountable for constitutional violations is sometimes inadvisable, even in
situations where they perceive that the police clearly violated their client’s
constitutional rights. Prevalent considerations include perceptions of lack of
judicial receptivity toward granting suppression motions; career concerns
due to pressure by judges and prosecutors to refrain from bringing
suppression motions; and fear of loss of favorable plea offers.

97
98
99

Interview with Respondent T6 (confidential interview on file with the authors).
Id.
Interview with Respondent T3 (confidential interview on file with the authors).
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1. Lack of Judicial Receptivity
A majority of defense attorneys we interviewed perceive that it is
extremely difficult and rare to win a suppression motion in court.
Specifically, nearly half of attorneys perceive that most judges are reluctant
to suppress evidence—regardless of the circumstances. “Judge [X]—you just
won’t win a suppression in there at all . . . just don’t even bother
filing . . . other than to preserve appeal rights and what not.”100 Attorneys
perceive variations in judicial receptivity to suppression motions, ranging
from judges that approach the process with an open mind, to those that never
grant suppression. A judge’s reputation often guides defense decisions
regarding whether or not to file a motion:
Some judges are far more receptive to this than others; a case that you might roll the
dice and file a suppression in front of one judge, you know it is going to be denied
without really any reasoning by another, it really influences what you do with the case
and how you advise your clients.101

More than half of the attorneys interviewed believe that suppression
motion decisions are heavily influenced by judges’ prior careers:
[If] they’re a former prosecutor, it is hard for them to say suppression because they
spent their career as a prosecutor. Traditionally in [X] County and most of the counties
in central [X] State, your judges are former prosecutors. They’re elected from the DA’s
Office, so it is very hard for them. They become friendly with the police because they
work closely with them. They know most of the chiefs of police in the local police
departments. Candidly, it’s just very difficult for them to set aside some of that
sometimes.102

Five attorneys in our interviews explained their perceptions that judges
are hesitant to “cancel cases” by granting suppression: “Rather than looking
at what the case law says and granting it, I think they have a hard time
suppressing evidence in general as a notion of cancelling the cases because
of a little bit of waywardness in the way it was handled.”103
2. Penalties for Bringing Suppression Motions
In addition to their own internal analyses regarding whether to fight a
given courtroom battle or strategically relent, a minority of attorneys
interviewed stated that they sometimes feel pressured by prosecutors or
judges to refrain from bringing suppression motions: “The fact that you could
call an officer’s testimony into credibility and that comes back on the defense
100
101
102
103

Interview with Respondent T5 (confidential interview on file with the authors).
Interview with Respondent T14 (confidential interview on file with the authors).
Interview with Respondent T24 (confidential interview on file with the authors).
Interview with Respondent T30 (confidential interview on file with the authors).
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attorney is very strange to me. But it is also very common.” A considerable
portion of attorneys (38%) in our interview sample described situations
where they were chastised by judges for challenging the police officer by
bringing a suppression motion. Others expressed being “warned” by the
prosecutor of possible repercussions should their client reject the plea and
file a motion: “I had a DA tell me that if a specific client didn’t take a deal
that she would take the deal off of the table for another client that was
completely unrelated.”104
3. Shorter Sentences Over Police Accountability
A majority of defense attorneys we interviewed noted that bringing
suppression motions often necessitates walking away from favorable plea
offers by the prosecution:
If you filed a suppression motion, and argued it, any plea negotiations went off of the
table. Like your client might have a really good motion but if he fought it and you lost,
the DA would then pull all deals, kind of like a punishment for exercising your right.105

As a result, some defense attorneys reported that they regularly advise
their clients to plead guilty in place of filing a suppression motion since this
course of action will likely result in a lighter sentence:
So I am sitting there talking to my client saying, “Yeah, you have a good suppression
issue. But you’re going to lose. But the DA’s offering you nine months. They’re going
to take it because they are guilty. Because they had the drugs, they were selling the
drugs, but the stop was bad. So they know in their minds, ‘I don’t want to do five years
in prison.’106

And another attorney stated, “There are situations where my clients
have said: ‘Listen, I want to get out of prison. I’ll plead to anything. I am not
interested in you filing a suppression motion.’”107
About a third of our respondents noted that cases involving the most
egregious police stops, searches and/or seizures often receive particularly
favorable plea offers. Several attorneys expressed their perceptions that these
offers are due to efforts by prosecutors and, at times, even judges, to avoid
suppression motions. For example, several attorneys discussed situations
where judges attempted to broker a plea deal between the prosecution and
the defense in order to avoid a suppression hearing:

104
105
106
107

Interview with Respondent T15 (confidential interview on file with the authors).
Interview with Respondent T14 (confidential interview on file with the authors).
Interview with Respondent T10 (confidential interview on file with the authors).
Interview with Respondent T20 (confidential interview on file with the authors).
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Judges will attempt to even work deals in chambers of, “What does your client want?
Are you willing to do that? If he pleads, are you [i.e., prosecutor] willing to give that
lighter sentence, so that a suppression hearing doesn’t go through?108

A few defense attorneys further noted their perceptions that prosecutors
extend the best offers in cases with significant Fourth Amendment violations
in order to hide police transgressions and protect the case. Regardless of the
prosecutor’s motivation in extending a particularly favorable plea offer, it is
often in their client’s best interest to take the plea. Consequently, defense
attorneys sometimes choose to refrain from holding the police accountable
for constitutional oversteps in court in some of the most blatant and egregious
cases.
D. SURVEY RESULTS

Figure 1 Defense attorneys’ perception of police expertise
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Note: Except the item on professionalism which includes 112 valid answers, all
other three items include 113 valid answers from the study sample.

1. Perceptions of Police Expertise
In Figure 1, we present our survey participants’ responses to the level
of trust they possess regarding police expertise in the areas of accuracy in
police reports, fair treatment to citizens, professionalism, and testimony in
court.
While more than half of our respondents in the survey sample who
provided valid answers (55%) either somewhat agree or strongly agree that
police perform their work in a professional manner, more than 50% voiced
distrust in the truthfulness of police reports and police testimony.
Furthermore, 46% of responding attorneys either somewhat disagree or
strongly disagree that police treat their clients fairly.
2. Perceptions of Judges and Prosecutors
We further sought attorneys’ perceptions regarding whether or not
judges and prosecutors are protective of the police. Of the 101 attorneys who
answered this item, 79% “somewhat agree” or “strongly agree” that judges
are protective of police officers on the stand; 87% indicated that they
“somewhat agree” or “strongly agree” that judges are often pro-prosecution.
Among the 140 respondents participating in our survey, 106 (76%) have
experience representing clients on Fourth Amendment challenges; 62%
reported that they “never” feel pressured by prosecutors to refrain from filing
a suppression motion where there is substantial evidence supporting a Fourth
amendment violation, while 27% reported that this “sometimes” happens.
Moreover, 81% reported that they “never” feel pressured by the judge to
refrain from filing a suppression motion where there is substantial evidence
supporting a Fourth Amendment violation, while 15% reported this
“sometimes” happens.
3. Factors in Filing Suppression Motions
In our survey, we asked respondents how important some factors are in
the defense attorney’s consideration of filing a suppression motion. Table 2
shows that evidentiary strength, strategic utility, and will of the client are the
top three most important factors in determining whether to file a suppression
motion. Some respondents typed in additional considerations. We analyzed
the content of the text which shows additional factors, such as the
applicability of case law to the case (eight respondents), the additional
expense (five respondents), the time it will add to the processing (two
respondents), the likelihood of the client entering a special DUI rehabilitation

526

NIR & LIU

[Vol. 111

program (two respondents) which is conditioned on not filing, and two
respondents wrote that the decision is also dependent on whether the officer
in the case was previously involved in similar Fourth Amendment
allegations. Relatedly, we also asked all survey respondents whether they
have witnessed the same officers being challenged more than once on Fourth
Amendment issues; 57% in the survey sample reported “yes.” When asked
further for an estimate of the number of officers involved, thirty-three
respondents typed in a number of five or fewer, or “very few,” “5-10%,”
including one who stated, “Three to four officers have been deemed ‘walking
suppression motions,’” and another who stated, “At least three particular
officers I am aware of get challenged consistently.” Sixteen of them wrote in
a number larger than five, with many writing along the lines of “too many to
count,” “dozens,” “many,” “quite a few,” and so on.
Table 2 Factors in deciding whether to file a suppression motion reported
by defense attorneys

Average
score
3.71

Std.
Dev.
1.02

The potential strategic benefit of this action in the plea negotiation

3.46

1.07

The will of the client

3.36

1.26

The potential of case going to trial

3.08

1.33

The likelihood of this motion being granted

2.86

1.28

How this decision will affect my relationship with my client

2.86

1.25

The practicality of motion preparation (e.g., time and resources)

1.86

1.03

How this decision will affect my relationship with the DA's office

1.24

0.56

How this decision will affect my relationship with the judge

1.22

0.53

Item content
The strength of supporting evidence

Note: 114 respondents reported on this item. The variable is coded as 1=Not at all important,
2=Slightly important, 3=Moderately important, 4=Very important, 5=Extremely important.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Improving police compliance with Fourth Amendment mandates
protects individuals from unreasonable searches and seizures and helps to
preserve the overall integrity of the criminal justice system;109 maintaining
109

Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961).

2021]

RIGHTS IN IMBALANCED COURTROOMS

527

an effective accountability structure for Fourth Amendment-related police
behavior is a critical step toward achieving these goals. At present, police
accountability for improper searches and seizures usually involves aggrieved
defendants bringing suppression motions in court.110 Conceptually, the threat
of suppression should deter unlawful police action because officers want to
prevent the loss of probative prosecution evidence as well as avoid being
reprimanded and embarrassed in court.111 In theory, all members of the
courtroom work group serve as checks on Fourth Amendment related police
conduct in a process primarily initiated by the defense.112 However, in
practice, history has shown that many police officers are not deterred by the
possibility of suppression and search and seizure violations occur on a regular
basis.113
We add to this literature by exploring how perceived power dynamics
within the court community often lead defense attorneys to conclude that
efforts to defend rights violations are not only futile but also sometimes
harmful to their clients’ cases, their own relationships with judges and
prosecutors, and ultimately their professional status within the court
community. We argue that these perceived environmental conditions
sometimes guide defense attorneys to rationally walk away from their critical
role in police accountability for the sake of favorable case resolutions and
career concerns, even in cases with seemingly egregious stop, search, or
seizure violations. Our work contributes a new dimension to existing
scholarship that illustrates that the Exclusionary Rule—as currently
operationalized by court actors—is a weak check on the constitutionality of
police behavior.
Furthermore, we add to the court community perspective regarding the
role of police in the community. We argue that defense attorneys perceive
the police as a critical part of the court community who hold more power
than themselves. As our respondents expressed, defense attorneys observe
the interactions of the police with other courtroom actors and regularly
witness prosecutorial and judicial deference and protection of police.114 They
perceive that judicial credibility determinations favor police. Moreover,
defense attorneys witness the personal relationships that many prosecutors,
police officers, and judges share, and some defense attorneys perceive that
110
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these relationships result in judicial and prosecutorial favoritism toward
police. In addition, as police officers attend court proceedings frequently,
defense attorneys may perceive them as “courtroom regulars” as defined by
the court community perspective.115 We argue that these perceptions help
guide defense attorneys’ actions and are critical to understanding court
community dynamics. In this regard, the fact that these perceptions are
prevalent among our respondents is significant in and of itself, regardless of
whether or not these perceptions are entirely accurate (e.g., perceived judicial
deference to police may deter defense attorneys from bringing suppression
motions, even if the perception is exaggerated due to bias).
As our data show, defense attorneys are concerned about their position
in the court community and may see the need to be accepted by court
community members more saliently and urgently than those who already
stand on the upper rung of the power ladder (e.g., prosecutors). Indeed, a
number of our respondents expressed the importance of forging and
maintaining positive relationships with prosecutors, judges, and police;
several attorneys even described steps that they take in order to achieve these
objectives. Apart from their own career concerns, it is in the best interests of
their clients for defense attorneys to get along with other court actors. 116
Consequently, zealous client advocacy may preclude asserting allegations of
police misconduct when such action can be viewed as “rocking the boat.”117
These decisions pose serious barriers to police accountability in court,
particularly in courtroom cultures where allegations of constitutional
violations could result in reprimand or retribution by more powerful
members of the court community.118
Our research further demonstrates that defense attorneys sometimes
refrain from filing suppression motions when they believe that bringing these
motions may jeopardize their ability to obtain a favorable case disposition
for their client. Many attorneys represent clients who are incarcerated or face
long periods of imprisonment if convicted. Rolling the dice by rejecting a
plea offer and bringing a suppression motion is risky. Many attorneys believe
that the chances of prevailing—even on a strong motion—are minimal
because of the unity between police officers, prosecutors, and judges, and the
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hesitancy of judges and prosecutors to question the credibility of police.119
Even in cases where the evidence screams suppression, a choice has to be
made: attempt to hold the police accountable in a system where challenging
the police is highly discouraged—and, at times, even punished—or produce
the best practical outcome for the defendant (e.g., a lighter sentence by
accepting a favorable plea deal).
Our qualitative interviews are corroborated by our survey results. The
survey provides an additional source of data that demonstrates that defense
attorneys take numerous factors relating to court community dynamics into
account in their decision-making processes regarding whether or not to bring
suppression motions. Strategic decisions—documented in both our surveys
and interviews—support the notion that perceptions of power dynamics
within the court community play an unmistakable and salient role in defense
attorney decisions to litigate rights violations.
In sum, our study demonstrates that while defense attorneys may desire
or even believe that it is their duty to expose rights violations, these
sentiments are often dwarfed by practical case resolutions or career
considerations resulting largely from perceptions of a profoundly imbalanced
court community that protects police. These findings pose serious concerns
regarding the ability of the current system to hold the police accountable for
constitutional violations. Defense attorneys play a critical role in protecting
rights violations; some may argue that their role in police accountability is
more essential than that of any other court actor.120 The Exclusionary Rule
can only be effective if court actors uphold it. Though choices to refrain from
bringing suppression motions to ensure more favorable case outcomes for
individual defendants or to protect important court community relationships
are understandable and rational in the current system, they highlight the need
for improved police accountability structures within the courts that deter
search and seizure violations and protect overall system integrity.
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